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Globalization and Sovereignty*
Julian Ku** & John Yoof
INTRODUCTION

Globalization represents the reality that we live in a time when the walls
of sovereignty are no protection against the movements of capital, labor,
information and ideas-nor can they provide effective protection against
harm and damage.'
This declaration by Judge Rosalyn Higgins, the former President of the
International Court of Justice, represents the conventional wisdom about the
future of global governance. Many view globalization as a reality that will erode
or even eliminate the sovereignty of nation-states.
The typical account points to at least three ways that globalization has
affected sovereignty. First, the rise of international trade and capital markets has
interfered with the ability of nation-states to control their domestic economies. 2
Second, nation-states have responded by delegating authority to international
organizations. 3 Third, a "new" international law, generated in part by these
organizations, has placed limitations on the independent conduct of domestic
policies. 4

. This paper was originally presented at a symposium held at the American Enterprise Institute in
Washington, D.C., on June 4, 2012. The symposium was entitled "I Pledge Allegiance to the
United ... Nations? Global Governance and the Challenge to the American Constitution."
. Professor of Law and Faculty Director of International Programs, Maurice A. Deane School of
Law, Hofstra University.
t Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; Visiting Scholar, American
Enterprise Institute. We thank James Cho for excellent research assistance.
1. Roslyn Higgins, InternationalLaw in a Changing InternationalSystem, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.
J. 78, 82 (1999).
2.

See DAVID HELD, ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND

CULTURE 187 (1999) ("Today, not only tariffs and quota restrictions, but also policies supporting
domestic industry and even domestic laws with respect to business competition and safety standards
are subject to growing international scrutiny and regulation.").
3. See Julian G. Ku, The Delegationof FederalPower to InternationalOrganizations:New
Problems With Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV 71, 88-113 (2000).
4. See JULIAN KU & JOHN YOO, TAMING GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, AND THE NEw WORLD ORDER 2-4, 19-25 (2012).
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These developments place sovereignty under serious pressure. But the
decline of national sovereignty is neither inevitable nor obviously desirable.
Nation-states maintain the current world order. Sovereignty allows nations to
protect democratic decision-making and individual liberties. Nor does robust
respect for sovereignty demand the rejection of globalization or international
cooperation.
We offer a new framework for accommodating globalization with
sovereignty. Our proposal shifts the focus away from Westphalian sovereignty,
which grants nations complete autonomy within their territories, and toward
"popular sovereignty"-the right of the American people to govern themselves
through the institutions of the Constitution. Article VI's Supremacy Clause
creates a hierarchy of federal law that places the Constitution first, followed by
"the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States." 5 This establishes the Constitution's superiority over all other authorities,
including international laws and norms. As long as the Constitution remains the
exclusive source of lawmaking authority within the United States, the regulation
of globalization must occur through the political and legal system created by the
Constitution.
In this essay, we will first define "globalization." We will then explore its
impact on national sovereignty and the rise of international institutions. Finally,
we will consider how popular sovereignty can accommodate globalization
through the Constitution's separation of powers and division of authority
between the federal and state governments.
I.
DEFINING GLOBALIZATION

Few terms are more ubiquitous in public affairs than "globalization."
Countless journal articles and publications analyze globalization in sociology,
political science, international relations, and cultural studies. Despite the breadth
of interest, there continues to be a substantial lack of consensus on the meaning
of the term. As Peter Spiro has observed, "globalization is so broad a
phenomenon that comprehensive description now seems almost futile." 6
To some, globalization includes the reduction of trade barriers and an
accompanying devotion to free markets. In The Lexus and the Olive Tree,
journalist Thomas Friedman popularized the concept of the "globalization
system" as involving the "inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and

5. U.S. CONST. ART. VI.
6. Peter Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L. J. 649,
660 (2002).
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technologies to a degree never witnessed before."7 The system results in the
"spread of free market capitalism to virtually every country in the world."8
Much of the public debate has revolved around the consequences of economic
liberalization, the reduction of trade barriers, and the global integration of
capital markets.9
But globalization has acquired a meaning broader than economic
liberalization. Scholars have also equated globalization with the
internationalization of societies and economies, the universalization of a "global
culture," the Westernization of societies along European or American models,
and finally the de-territorialization of geography and social space. 10
These definitions share some basic elements, such as the acceleration in
cross-border activity between governments, businesses, institutions, and
individuals. While transnational economics has drawn the most attention,
globalization also includes the growth of political cooperation, migration, and
communications, as well as sharp reductions in transportation costs and the
blending of national societies and cultures. 1 Many see the rise of a global civil
society, which represents new opportunities for individuals to participate in
social and cultural activities that reach beyond the nation. According to this
view, the explosion of cross-border interaction has strengthened international
12
institutions and the development of cosmopolitan legal obligations.
In our view, "globalization" refers to the various processes of economic,
social, cultural, and political integration across national borders. Globalization
has a profound effect on the concept of physical territory as an organizing
principle for social, cultural, economic, or political relations. 13 An individual
located in an industrialized nation may just as likely communicate, interact, or
work with someone abroad versus at home. Physical territory has become less
important in defining an individual's identity, loyalty, or culture. We do not
address in this article whether contemporary globalization is fundamentally
different from prior periods of high cross-border activity. 14 Nor do we consider
which of the various forces-technology, economic exchange, or the end of the
Cold War-is the root cause. We believe that all of these forces have

7.

THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 8 (2000).

8.

Id.

9. See, e.g., DANIEL DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL 10 (2006); JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN
DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2004); JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

(2002).
10.

JAN AART SCHOLTE, GLOBALIZATION: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 15-16 (2000).

11.
12.

See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLRIDGE, A FUTURE PERFECT (2000).

13.

DAVID HELD, ET AL., supra note 13, at 2-3.

See SCHOLTE, supra note 10, at 178-80.

14. For an example of this argument, see PAUL HIRST & GRAHAME THOMPSON,
GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION: THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF
GOVERNANCE (1996).

GLOBALIZATIONAND SOVEREIGNTY

2013]

213

contributed to it. For our purposes, it is the consequences, not the causes, of
today's globalization that are central to our analysis.
II.
THE RISE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Most globalization scholarship emphasizes three phenomena that diminish
nation-state sovereignty. First, a substantial number of commentators have
focused on the impact of the increased levels of trade accompanied by the rise of
globalized financial markets. Economic integration has, in the eyes of some, led
to the decline of the nation-state as a unit of social organization. 15 Second,
globalization has led to an increase in the number and influence of international
organizations, which have gained more independence and claimed the power to
exercise sovereign powers themselves.1 6 Third, globalization has produced a
fundamental shift in the nature of international law. The "new international law"
purports to create universal, binding obligations regulating a nation-state's
treatment of its own citizens. Some scholars have even suggested that this new
form of law should receive a new name: "cosmopolitan law" or "world law."1 7
This new international law has become an important mechanism for NGOs
seeking to influence or limit the ability of nation-states to exercise their
sovereign powers. All three of these trends contribute to a growing system of
"global governance." We consider each aspect of global governance in turn.
A. The Impact ofan Increasingly IntegratedGlobal Economy
Globalization exerts a profound effect on the domestic economy in two
main ways. First, the sharp reduction of tariffs and trade barriers since the end of
World War II, which has accelerated in the past two decades, has created the
free movement of goods and services that is central to globalization. In 1990, the
total value of trade in goods was slightly more than 30% of global GDP; by
2009, the value of such trade exceeded 40% of global GDP. 18 In the Eurozone,
the value of trade in goods grew from 44% of Eurozone GDP in 1990 to 57% in

15.
See, e.g., KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL
ECONOMIES (1995).

16. See Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizationsand InternationalLaw, I00 AM. J.
INT'L L. 348, 354 (2006) ("NGOs are now often engaged in the review and promotion of state
compliance with international obligations.").
17.

See, e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-54 (2008).

18.

WORLD

BANK,

THE

LITTLE

DATA

BOOK

2

(2011),

http://www-

wds.worldbank.org/extemal/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2011/08/16/000333037_2011081
6012153/Rendered/PDF/63847WDIOExtoOOBoxO361527BOPUBLICO.pdf.
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2009.19 For the United States, the overall percentage is lower, but increased
from 15% to almost 19% of GDP between 1990 and 2009.20
Since the end of the Cold War, international trade has expanded to a much
larger group of nations, while its intensity among developed nations has
deepened. Developing countries have sharply boosted their participation in the
world trading system. The lowest-income countries have increased their share of
world merchandise trade from about 30% of their GDPs in 1990 to nearly 50%
in 2009.21
Second, globalization has spurred the cross-border movement of capital,
which has outpaced the level of trade in goods. Foreign direct investment, for
instance, has grown from about $212 billion in 1990 to over $1.1 trillion in
2009.22 Nation-states have facilitated this explosion by easing controls on the
movement of capital and tariffs on foreign goods and services. As national
barriers to cross-border economic activity have fallen, nation-states have
become more vulnerable to global market forces. 23 As international trade
becomes a larger and more important part of domestic economic output, nationstates that impose significant tariffs or provide large domestic subsidies face the
danger of painful retaliation. 2 4
Commentators suggest that international capital markets prevent nationstates from pursuing independent macroeconomic policies. Nation-states, for
example, cannot fully control the value of their currencies. Private traders forced
the United Kingdom to allow movement in the pound, though more authoritarian
nations like China have maintained a tighter grip. 2 5 Currency fluctuation, in
turn, has limited the ability of nation-states to pursue macroeconomic policies
that fuel growth by expanding the money supply. 26 International markets may
impose similar constraints on fiscal policy. Because national governments issue
bonds on the international capital markets, they find their ability to set domestic

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 2.
See e.g., Bang Nam Jeon, From the 1997-8 Asian FinancialCrisis to the 2008-9 Global

Economic Crisis: Lessons from Korea's Experience, 5 E. ASIA L. REV.

103, 114-19 (2010)

(evaluating South Korea's "ill-prepared" financial liberalization as one of the potential causes of its
problems in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis).
24. Brazil Threatens Retaliation in Dispute on Cotton Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/09/business/global/09trade.html?_r-0 (describing Brazil's threat
to impose retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods).
25. See David Litterick, Billionaire Who Broke the Bank of England, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Dec. 13, 2002, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2773265/Billionaire-who-broke-the-Bank-ofEngland.html (describing George Soros's role in forcing the United Kingdom to devalue the pound).
26.

See

Set

the

Money

Free,

THE

ECONOMIST,

Mar.

3,

http://www.economist.com/node/21548943 (describing the Chinese system of capital controls).

2012,

2013]

GLOBALIZATIONAND SOVERETGNTY

215

policy constrained by the value of their securities. The international debt
markets may penalize nation-states that run up substantial budget deficits. 27 In
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, nations like Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
and Spain radically changed their fiscal policies under pressure from
international capital markets, the European Union, and the International
Monetary Fund. 28
To be sure, this account might overstate the impact of economic
globalization on nation-state autonomy. Nation-states, especially those with
large domestic economies-like the United States-are far from powerless to set
economic policy. 29 Nation-states are unlikely to disappear simply because of
higher trade and capital flows. But economic globalization has constrained the
ability of nation-states to adopt domestic economic policies freely, though the
scope of this restriction remains contested.
B. The Rise ofInternationalOrganizations
In addition to cross-border trade and capital movements, globalization has
prompted the rise of international organizations (IOs) as a key new actor in
international relations. International organizations are legal entities established
by more than one nation-state pursuant to an international agreement. 30 They
have a legal personality, which enables them to exercise rights and fulfil duties
on the international plane independently. 3 1 Recognition of this special status in

27. HELD, supra note 2, at 229-30.
28. See James Kanter, European Finance Ministers and IM.F Reach Deal on Greek Bailout
Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ll/27business/global/eurofinance-ministers-confront-a-standoff-over-greece.html ("[T]he I.M.F. pressed ministers to agree
that Greece's debt should be cut by about 20 percent of G.D.P. through methods that include the debt
buyback program at discounted prices, lowering interest rates, lengthening the deadlines for debt
repayments, and returning profits to Greece made on bonds bought by the European Central Bank.");
Stephen Castle and Liz Alderman, EuropeApproves Irish Rescue and New Rules on Bailouts, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/business/global/29euro.html ('Dublin
has said it would try to cut its budget deficit to 3 percent of gross domestic product by 2014, from 32
percent now . . .. "); Raphael Minder, PortugalAgreesto a $116 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/business /global/04portugal.html ("[U]nder the threeyear plan, the deficit would need to be lowered to 5.9 percent of gross domestic product this year,
4.5 percent in 2012 and 3 percent in 2013."); Raphael Minder and James Kanter, Spanish Banks
Agree to Layoffs and Other Cuts to Receive Rescue Funds in Return, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/business/global/european-commission-approves-bailout-offour-spanish-banks.html ("The European Commission ... approved a payment of 37 billion euros,
or $48 billion, from the euro zone bailout fund to four Spanish banks on the condition that they lay
off thousands of employees and close offices.").
29. See DREZNER, supranote 9.
30.

See RESTATMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§

221 (1987).
31. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. I1) (recognizing the legal personality of the United Nations). See
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the years after World War II represents a significant shift from Westphalian
sovereignty.
According to one commentator, interstate relations "are increasingly
mediated through rationalized institutional processes" rather than the anarchy of
the Westphalian system. 32 The role of IOs can be overstated. Nation-states still
make the basic decisions of international politics and possess the personnel,
budgets, and will to pursue policies with real effects in world affairs. 33 But there
can be little dispute that independent institutions influence international politics
as never before. While a border dispute between two nations once may have
produced a bilateral settlement or armed conflict, today global governance
regimes might shift the decision to a body like the International Court of
Justice. 34 Similarly, a trade dispute that might once have provoked retaliatory
tariffs will now be resolved by the WTO.
Although IOs have existed since at least the nineteenth century, their recent
proliferation has led at least one provocative study to hail them as the nationstate's successor. As that study describes it, "sovereignty has taken a new form,
composed under a series of national and supranational organisms united under a
single rule of logic. This new global form of sovereignty is what we call
Empire." 35 IOs, however, have yet to reach the power and control to justify such
claims. Moreover, too simplistic a characterization may suggest either that all
IOs are alike or fit into a single political hierarchy. While some IOs may
challenge national sovereignty, others do not, and many, in our opinion, have
little impact at all.
IOs bear a substantial diversity in both form and purpose. Some IOs take
the form of international tribunals that resolve disputes between nations. The
commission established by the 1795 Jay Treaty to settle claims arising out of the
Revolutionary War is one example. 36 A modern international tribunal is the ICJ,
which the United Nations Charter established to resolve disputes between
members. 37 Other IOs take the form of agencies designed to administer and

also, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Organizations,61 YALE L.J. Ill, Ill n.3 (1952)
("The Reparations Case is the first judicial recognition of the legal personality of an international
organization.").
32. Spiro, supranote 6, at 660.
33. For a skeptical view of international institutions, see John Mearsheimer, The False
Promise of InternationalInstitutions, 19 INT'L SECURITY 5 (1994).
34. See, e.g., Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening), 2002 I.C.J. No. 94 (Oct.10).
35.

MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE xii (2000).

36. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Eng., art. 5, Nov. 19, 1794, 12 T.S. 13
(Jay Treaty). See John Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the
OriginalUnderstanding,99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955, 2074-77 (1999).
37. U.N. Charter arts. 92-96. See Eric Posner & John Yoo, Judicial Independence in
InternationalTribunals, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1, 34-41 (2005).
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implement policies or technical standards arising from an international legal
regime. Classic examples are the Universal Postal Union, which administers
rules governing international mail, and the International Telecommunications
Union.3 8 Still, other IOs function as fora for the discussion of issues and joint
policies. An example is the U.N. General Assembly (GA), which guarantees
member states' rights to raise and discuss issues of concern. The GA may also
pass resolutions and recommendations, but, unlike the U.N. Security Council, it
cannot require nations to take action. 39
IOs pursue a wide variety of purposes. The most basic IO is created by an
agreement between two states for a specific purpose. The United States and
Great Britain formed a series of boundary commissions between 1794 and 1925
to settle and demarcate the boundary between the United States and Canada. 40
The two countries then established a permanent International Boundary
Commission in 1925 to inspect and maintain the boundary line. 4 1
At the other end of the power spectrum is the U.N. Security Council. It is
composed of five permanent members and ten rotating members authorized to
take measures for the "maintenance of international peace and security.'4 2 Its
legal mandate authorizes it to act on any matter affecting international peace and
security in the territory of any nation. 43 The veto right of the five permanent
members has prevented the U.N. Security Council from exercising this broad
power very often.44
Most IOs fall somewhere between the Boundary Commission and the U.N.
Security Council. While the U.N. represents the largest network of IOs, other
IOs may exist outside it. Although almost all members of the WTO are also
members of the U.N., for example, the two are institutionally independent and
only loosely associated legally.
It is not possible to maintain the view that there is a single "world
government" or single 10 that threatens U.S. sovereignty. The closest attempt to
create a single overarching 10, the U.N., resulted in more of a conglomeration
than a single entity. The principal components of the U.N. system often operate

38. Convention on Universal Postal Union, May 23, 1939; Comstitution of the International
Telecommunications Union, 1932.
39. U.N. Charter arts. 9-22.
40. See generally David C. Weiss, The International Bondary Commission, Treaty
Interpretation, and the President's Removal Power, 41 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 39 (2009); L.M.
BLOOMFIELD & GERALD F. FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATER PROBLEMS OF CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES 1 (1958).
41.

Treaty of Lake Superior-Lake of the Woods Boundary, U.S.-Eng., Feb. 24, 1925 6 T.S. 7.

42.

U.N. Charter, art. 24, para. 1.

43.

Id., arts. 1, 39, 42.

44.
(2009).

See Robert Delahunty & John Yoo, Great Power Security, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 35, 42-44
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independently of the others without any single administrator.4 5 Myriad agencies
associated with the U.N., such as the World Health Organization or the U.N.
International Children's Fund (UNICEF), also operate on a quasi-independent
basis and do not directly answer to a common administrator. 4 6
But the diffuse, diverse, and nonhierarchical nature of IOs does not mean
they cannot affect sovereignty. Two 10 characteristics diminish nation-state
sovereignty: independence and heightened powers. It seems counterintuitive that
IOs would ever limit the sovereignty of nations. Principal-agent theory predicts
that nation-states will delegate power to IOs when the latter further the formers'
interests. 4 7 Nation-states establish IOs to resolve interstate disputes, administer
technical standards, create fora to discuss policies, or settle various other issues.
But IOs must reflect the interests of more than one member, which means they
will not be completely beholden to any nation-state. The willingness of nations
to create an 10 outside of their direct control-one that might issue decisions
contrary to their future interests-sends a signals that the nations intend to live
up to the commitments of the 10.
Nations may suffer some short-term setbacks from an independent 10, but
they may still benefit from longer-term cooperation with other countries. To be
sure, the level of independence will vary. An 10 like the ICJ needs more
independence to resolve border disputes between nations. Otherwise, the parties
could simply negotiate a settlement. On the other hand, the parties to the dispute
can establish the range of possible outcomes that they will accept before they
bring it to the Court.
IOs can achieve independence in a number of ways. First and foremost, IOs
can be staffed and led by individuals who are independent from their member
states. Such independence is, we argue, reflected in the appointment and
removal of officials. ICJ judges are selected by a vote of the U.N. General
Assembly with subsequent approval by the U.N. Security Council, which limits
the ability of nation-states to place their nationals on the Court. 4 8 ICJ judges can
be re-elected to nine-year terms and can be removed only by a unanimous vote
of the other judges. 49 Although there is some evidence that ICJ judges vote in
favor of their home states, 50 the method of selecting the ICJ judges can secure

45. For a description of the relationship between the various U.N. agencies and bodies, see
The United Nations System, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/pdfs/un-system-chart-colorsm.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).
46. See id.
47. DARREN G. HAWKINS,
ORGANIZATIONS 12-17 (2006).

ET

AL.,

DELEGATION

AND

AGENCY

IN

INTERNATIONAL

48. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 2-12.
49. Id., arts. 13, 18.
50. Eric A Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is The InternationalCourt ofJustice Biased?,
34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599, 624 (2005) (finding that "[ICJ] [j]udges vote for their home states about 90
percent of the time").
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greater independence. For example, the sitting American ICJ judge over the past
couple decades has supported ICJ decisions against the United States. 5 1
At the opposite end of the spectrum, we argue that representatives to the
U.N. Security Council neither have nor expect independence. The
representatives, usually ambassadors to the U.N., 52 are appointed and can be
removed by their home states for any reason. Under these circumstances, U.N.
Security Council representatives will vote according to the wishes of their home
states. The U.N. would then likely assume that each ambassador will represent
the interests of his or her own country, and according to this view, the GA
provides a forum where they can air their interests openly.
Even the most independent 10 encounters some limits. The ICJ is funded
by GA appropriations, so member states exercise some financial leverage over
the ICJ. 53 But even the most dependent IOs, like the U.N. Security Council, can
adopt measures that are not supported by some of the member states. 5 4 While

51. Indeed, in all four judgments involving the United States over the past couple decades, the
sitting American judge on the ICJ has voted against American interests. See Request for
Interpretation of Judgment of 31 March 2004 in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2009 I.C.J. 3, 20-21 (Jan. 19) (J. Buergenthal with the majority, finding
Mexico's request for interpretation exceeded the scope of the court's judgment, but finding
unanimously that the United States "breached" its obligation under the court's July 6, 2008 order
regarding Jos& Ernesto Medellin Rojas); Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 12, 70-72 (Mar. 31) (J. Buergenthal with the majority, finding that the United States breached
its obligations to Mexico under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations); Oil Platforms (Iran
v. U.S.) 2003 1.C.J. 161, 218-19 (Nov. 6) (J. Buergenthal with the majority, denying the U.S.
counter-claim and finding that while "the actions of the United States... against Iranian oil
platforms ... cannot be justified as measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of
the United States . .. [the] Court cannot however (find] that those actions constitute a breach of the
obligation of the United States"); LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.) 2001 I.C.J. 466, 514-16 (June 27) (J.
Buergenthal with the majority, finding that the United States violated its obligations to Germany
under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, but dissenting with the majority on a
procedural issue).
52. Hans Kelsen, Organizationand Procedureof the Security Council of the United Nations,
59 HARV. L. REV. 1087, 1087 n.l (1946) ("The Security Council, like the General Assembly,
consists of representatives of the states which are 'members' in the sense of being authorized to be
represented by certain individuals. These individuals are appointed by the "member" states, not by
the United Nations, as are, for instance, the Secretary-General and the members of the International
Court of Justice. They are bound to act in conformity with the instructions given to them by the
competent organs of their states."). The list of the current members of the Security Council can be
found at http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/. The list of current permanent representatives to the
United Nations can be found at http://www.un.int/protocol/documents/HeadsofMissions.pdf.
53. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 33 ("The expenses of the Court shall
be borne by the United Nations in such a manner as shall be decided by the General Assembly.").
See also Report of the International Court of Justice, Aug. 1, 2011-July 31, 2012, 63, U.N. Doc.
A/67/4; GAOR, 67th Sess., Supp. No. 4 (Aug. 1, 2012).
54. See U.N. Charter, art. 27(3) ("Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall
be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent
members."); U.N. Charter, art. 25 ("The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.").
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this could not apply to the permanent members because of their veto, rotating
members may have to follow a policy that they opposed. 55
What remains clear is that independence represents a challenge to nationstate sovereignty. In at least some cases, 10 decision-makers that are shielded
from the control of the nation-states they purportedly represent can impose
obligations on nation-states without their consent. 56 This, if true, would increase
the likelihood of a real conflict between the 10 and the nation-states that formed
it.

Traditionally, IOs did not directly exercise sovereign powers. Instead, the
obligations of states were to be carried out through national domestic legal
process. An international arbitral tribunal, such as the U.S.-Mexico Claims
Commission, might require a party to pay damages for mistreating citizens of a
foreign country. 57 But the nation-state, via its own domestic law processes, has
the final word on how and whether to comply with the decision. This fits within
the traditional Westphalian principle that a state's consent was necessary to any
diminution of its sovereignty.
Recently, however, IOs have begun to acquire sovereign powers previously
held by nation-states. Not only does the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have
the power to order a nation-state's compliance with the E.U. treaties, its
judgments also have direct effect within domestic legal systems.58 Unlike
traditional IOs such as the U.S-Mexican Claims Commission, the ECJ is
exercising the sovereign power to interpret and apply treaty obligations within
the domestic legal systems of its member nation-states. 59
In the view of the ECJ, E.U. member states have "limited their sovereign
rights" and have created a body of law that binds both individuals and E.U.
countries. 60 While there has been some controversy over whether ECJ
judgments would trump constitutional obligations, the basic framework has
largely gone unchallenged. The ECJ, as well as other institutions of the

55. See id.
56. For example, the WTO panel Appellate Body members have an obligation to remain
independent from their home countries. Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, Dispute Settlement
Understanding, art. 17 para. 3, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dsu-e.htm#17 ("The
Appellate Body shall comprise persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law,
international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally. They shall be
unaffiliated with any government .... ).
57. Convention for Reciprocal Settlement of Claims, U.S.-Mex., art. 1, Sept. 8, 1923, 9 T.S.
935.
58. Case 6-64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585 (establishing the supremacy of
European Union law over the domestic laws of member states).
59. Posner & Yoo, supra note 37, at 57-62.
60. Case 26/62, Van Gend En Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963
E.C.R. 1, 12.
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European Union, have acquired sovereign powers from member states to
override significant parts of domestic law.
The United States has also experimented with the transfer of sovereign
powers in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Prior to
NAFTA, the Commerce Department had the absolute and exclusive power to
impose duties on foreign imports that it believed were either unfairly subsidized
or "dumped" on the U.S. market. 6 1 Since the passage of NAFTA in 1994,
however, U.S. duties on Canadian or Mexican imports have been challenged in
NAFTA arbitration panels. 62 No legal appeal to a U.S. court or U.S. agency is
permitted. 6 3
IOs can influence nation-states without directly exercising sovereign
powers. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have required
borrowers to adopt domestic policies such as raising taxes, cutting spending, or
lifting controls on financial flows. 64 It is important not to overstate these
developments. Transfers of sovereign power are, we argue, in their early stages.
The process is furthest along in the European Union, where the member states
have, in our opinion, delegated significant authority over a wide variety of
matters. Europe itself may not present the clearest picture, because the European
Union may signify the creation of what we would describe as a new regional
confederation, or even nation, rather, a supranational government. In most areas,
IOs still seem to lack their own direct enforcement resources and still seem to
rely on nation-states for compliance. 6 5 But we also see an undeniable trend
toward IOs with the legal authority to act directly in areas that used to be the
province of nations. 66
Serious conflicts between an 10 and a nation are, we would argue, most
likely to occur where that 10 both has a meaningful level of independence and
exercises sovereign powers. An IO that was independent of a nation-state but
did not exercise sovereign powers would not be likely to create any serious
conflict. An IO that does exercise sovereign powers but remains completely

61. 19 U.S.C.A. Ch. 4 (The "Tariff Act of 1930").
62. See, e.g., In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Final
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, USA-CDA-2002-1904-03 (Dec. 1, 2004) (finding
U.S. duties on Canadian softwood lumber to violated the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)).
63. North American Free Trade Agreement Annex 1904.15, Jan. 1, 1994, T.I.A.S. No. 12,516,
32 1.L.M. 289.
64.

HAROLD JAMES, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION SINCE BRETTON WOODs 323-25 (1996)

(explaining how the terms of IMF loans often require the borrowing country engage in trade
liberalization and abide by various budgetary and domestic credit restraints).
65. See, e.g., Ku, Delegation of Federal Power, supra note 3, at 95-99 (describing WTO power
to impose obligations on the United States).
66. Id. at 95-114 (describing the role of international organizations in regulating areas such as
criminal procedure, domestic chemical production, and trade in wildlife).
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under the control of a particular nation-state is, according to this argument, also
unlikely to create serious problems.
The system of global governance, described by many globalization
scholars, reserves an important place for independent IOs. 67 Parallel to the
upward shift of power to supranational organizations is a downward shift to
subnational governments, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals. A
number of scholars have described this phenomenon as the "disaggregation of
the nation-state." 68 One aspect of disaggregation poses serious constitutional
difficulties. NGOs have, we claim, increasingly used litigation in domestic U.S.
courts to build support for international legal norms, and to depart from the
policies set by the legislative or executive branches. 69
Key to this phenomenon is a new kind of international law, which has two
qualities. First, international law's emphasis on human rights, we believe, has
increasingly focused on cosmopolitan or universalist obligations-by which we
mean that they appeal to rights held by all of mankind, rather than by individuals
in specific political communities. These values demand greater regulation of a
government's treatment of its own citizens, which has traditionally resided
exclusively within the sovereignty of the nation-state. Second, influence over the
interpretation of international law, which had relied heavily on the practice of
nation-states, has shifted toward independent IOs, nongovernmental
organizations, and transnational elites. 70
International law has an ancient pedigree. 71 The classic statement of the
traditional approach is found in the S.S. Lotus opinion of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ). "International law governs relations between
independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from
their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted
as expressing principles of law." 72 Traditional international law reflects, in
many ways, the basic assumptions of the Westphalian system, as we understand
it. Its pillar, according to this understanding, is the absolute sovereignty of
nation-states, and it binds a state only by consent through formal treaty or
practice and custom. No central organization enforces rules on dissenting states.

67. See, e.g., MICHAEL BARNETT AND MARTHA FINNEMORE,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2004).

RULES FOR THE WORLD:

68. See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 6, at 657.
69. For a classic statement of the importance of this kind of NGO litigation, see Harold
Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991).
70. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw, 106 YALE L. J.
2599 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublicLaw Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991).
For criticism, see Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary InternationalLaw, 40 VA. J. INT'L L.
449 (2000).
71. See, e.g., COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT
GREECE AND ROME (1911); DAVID BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANTIQUITY (2001).

72.

The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
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The nation-state is the only actor in this system, as we understand it, because
international law applies exclusively to relations between sovereigns.
Private actors are largely excluded from the development of international
law. The unlawful detention of an ambassador doesn't violate her rights as an
individual; it violates the sovereign's right to the inviolability of its diplomatic
personnel. A private individual seeking vindication of his rights against a nation
must convince his own government to seek a settlement. This principle is part
and parcel of the 1945 ICJ statute, 73 and was affirmed by the ICJ as late as
1970, when it rejected the right of shareholders to seek remedies against a state
and required instead diplomatic espousal. 74
Because traditional international law focused on developing rules for states
in their relations with one another, an individual harmed by another nation or its
citizens would have to seek relief through her own court system. Nothing in
international law itself, however, forbids a domestic court from using
international rules as a source of guidance or persuasive authority. U.S. courts
have applied rules of general international law when no other rules of decision,
in the form of treaties, statutes, or executive declarations, governed. As the U.S.
Supreme Court has explained: "[W]here there is no treaty and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations and as evidence of these, to the works of
jurists and commentators." 75
C. The New InternationalLaw
Recently, commentators have described the rise of a new kind of
international law. They have used different terms, such as "world law,"
"supranational law," or "cosmopolitan law," to distinguish it from traditional
international law. 76 There are two noteworthy features of this new international
law that raise serious issues under the U.S. Constitution. First, the new
international law is openly concerned with the relationship between a nation and
its own citizens or between citizens of different nations. The Restatement
(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965) did not take a
position on whether international law was limited to state-to-state relations. 77

73.

Statute of International Court of Justice, art. 34, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S.

993.
74. Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co., Ltd. (Beig. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3,
45, 78 (Feb. 5).
75. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
76. See Peter Hay, SupranationalOrganizations and United States Constitutional Law, 6 VA.
J. INT'L L. 195, 195-96 (1966); Patrick Tangney, The New Internationalism: The Cession of
Sovereign Competences to SupranationalOrganizations and Constitutional Change in the United
States and Germany, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 395, 399-404 (1996).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § I
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Twenty-five years later, the Restatement (Third) unequivocally stated that
international law includes rules and principles governing states' "relations with
persons, whether natural or juridical."7 8 This represents a significant shift from
the ICJ's assertion that individuals "have no remedy in international law." 79 The
most prominent example is human rights law, whose most important innovation
is its insistence that human rights are universal. Under the traditional conception
of international law, as we understand it, if a wrongdoing state was an injured
person's own state, then the individual had no remedy under international law.80
If France, for example, wanted to deprive its citizens of the right to free speech,
that would be, under our understanding of the traditional conception, of no
interest to the United States, which could not claim any harm to its own citizens.
International human rights law, we think, denies this basic premise. It maintains
that harming an individual's international human rights, even by her own
government, remains a violation of international law. 81
This inevitably expands the subject matter of international law. The
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights guarantees the individual
rights of free expression, political association, property, life, and procedural
justice, among others. 82 Similarly, the International Convention on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights guarantees the right to health care, economic wellbeing, and work.8 3 Both agreements operate as a limitation on nations' domestic
policies. For instance, during its recent report on its compliance with the ICCPR,
the U.S. government responded to concerns raised by the UNHRC about its
84
protection of the right to vote during the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections.
NGOs have filed charges with the U.N. alleging widespread violations by the

(1964-65) (defining international law as "those rules of law applicable to a state or international
organization that cannot be modified unilaterally by it").
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 101,
n.1 (1986).
79. Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 45,
78 (Feb. 5) ("The Court would here observe that, within the limits prescribed by international law, a
State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for
it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal persons on whose behalf it is
acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international
law.").
80. Id. 78 (describing individual's inability to assert rights under international law).
81. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and American Democracy, I CHI. J.
INTL. L. 237, 241 (2000) ("[Human rights law] asserts that certain humane values, through a process
of international dissemination and support, have become binding rules that constrain what states may
to do to both their own and other countries' citizens.").
82. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 1, paras. 1-2, 6, para. 1, 14, 19,
para. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
83. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, arts. 6, para. 1, 7(ii), 12,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
84. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant,
Third Periodic Report of States Parties Due in 2003, United States of America, paras. 397-405.
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United States of the rights to vote, to a fair trial, to adequate health care, and to
adequate housing. 85 Whether or not there is merit to these charges, we think that
the U.S. government's acknowledgment that it has international obligations to
guarantee individual rights represents a substantial departure from traditional
international law's assumption of a state's absolute and exclusive sovereignty
within its own territory.
The second hallmark of the new international law is that the processes for
creating, interpreting, and enforcing international law have changed.
Traditionally, the interpretation and application of international law relied
heavily on the practice and opinion of nation-states. A nation-state that refused
to follow a custom, or refused to recognize it as a legal rule, could not be bound.
With respect to treaties, a nation-state controlled whether or not it signed.
The role of state consent in the new international law has become less
important because of the combination ofjus cogens obligations and international
human rights law. Jus cogens obligations consist of those clear and wellestablished international obligations, such as the prohibitions on genocide,
torture, and piracy, which bind nation-states even without their consent. 86
International human rights law seeks to expand the scope of norms considered
jus cogens, which reduces the freedom of nation-states to change, interpret, and
apply international law.
Non-state actors have come to influence the content and scope of many
different kinds of international law, perhaps most so in the area of customary
international law (CL). Unchained from traditional international law's rigid
focus on nation-states, NGOs have become important, sometimes dominant
actors in the formation, interpretation, and enforcement of new international
law. 87 Traditionally, CIL required long-standing, uniform practice of states
resulting from the states' sense of legal obligation (known as "opiniojuris").88
NGOs cannot alter the substantive definition of CIL, but they have attempted to
change the process by which state practice is identified. In the past, state
practice would come to light after decades, if not centuries, of diplomatic
conduct by nation-states. NGOs and IOs have sought to accelerate this process
by promulgating a new norm of international law, persuading states to adopt it,

85. International Human Rights Law & Hurricane Katrina: ICCPR Violations by the United
States Government, United Nations Human Rights Committee Hearings of 17 & July 18, 2006, 87th
Session, http://www.ohchr.org/englishIbodies/hrc/docs/ngos/nba.pdf.
86. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 8
I.L.M. 679 ("[Jus cogens] is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only
by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character."). See also Siderman
de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1992).
87. See Charnovitz, supra note 16.
88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§102(2) (1987).
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and then arguing that dissenting states refusing to follow are bound by universal
practice. 89 Today, multilateral treaties 90 and even "diplomatic correspondence,
treaties, public statements by heads of state, domestic laws" 9 1 have been
accepted as manifestations of CIL, or at least as elements of it. In this way,
NGOs outside the control of any nation-state can use their influence to co-opt
the process of identifying customary state practice, effectively imposing legal
obligations on unwilling nations, further reducing their sovereignty. 92
The possibilities of this non-state method of developing international law
have seized the attention of scholars and advocates. Harold Koh calls for a new
method of developing international law; his "transnational legal process"
emphasizes the central role that private transnational organizations play in the
formation of international law. 93 Lawyers working in concert, often through
transnational nongovernmental associations, can, according to Koh's account,
persuade domestic courts to recognize an international norm without
94
intervention or approval by the political branches of a nation's government.
While traditional international law focuses on state practice, the new
international law can be shaped first by domestic litigation driven by NGOs.
NGOs have sought, in at least several instances of U.S. litigation, to establish
international law obligations imposing aiding-and-abetting liability on
corporations, the right to organize workers, freedom from capital punishment,
freedom from pollution, and freedom from arbitrary detention.95
The success, or lack thereof, of these litigation strategies is not as important
as their goal. Rather than analyzing state practice or seeking diplomatic opinion,
the decentralized lawmaking process allows NGOs to set the international
lawmaking agenda and win recognition of new international legal norms. This
process also allows IOs without any formal sovereign power, such as the
UNHRC, to play a significant role in the interpretation and development of
international law.

89.

See generally Patrick J. Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J.

INT'L L. 499 (2000).

90. Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. I15, 16163 (describing how "[t]he ICJ seems to accept that treaties can serve as evidence of CIL").
91. Id. at 125-26 (describing various views on what qualifies as state practice for CIL).
92. For a general description and description of this development, see Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399
(2000).
93. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996).
94. See id. at 197 (discussing how various nongovernmental groups pressured President
Clinton to change his policy on the extraterritorial return of Haitian and Cuban refugees in 1994).
95. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp.,
414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp.
2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

2013]

GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY

227

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a combination of transnational NGOs and
independent IOs has challenged the legality of various aspects of the U.S.
government's war on terrorism. 96 Transnational NGOs, for instance, have
participated in domestic litigation to argue that the U.S. government's rendition,
detention, interrogation, and trial by military commission of alleged terrorists
violates both international human rights law and international humanitarian
law. 9 7 Buttressed by legal opinions from independent IOs like the Council of
Europe and the UNHRC, such litigation has had partial success in overturning
some U.S. government policies, despite the government's contrary views about
the interpretation of the relevant international law norms. 98
III.
RECONCILING GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY

The three aspects of globalization discussed above substantially affect the
sovereignty of nation-states. In this section, we distinguish between the most
widely used conception of sovereignty-Westphalian sovereignty and popular
sovereignty.
A. Westphalian Sovereignty
Nation-state sovereignty is often thought to be synonymous with
Westphalian sovereignty. Westphalian sovereignty assumes the absolute control
of nation-states over all conduct that occurs within their own territories. As
described by Chief Justice John Marshall:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and
absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction
upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its

sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty
to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.99
A nation's sovereignty, then, can be diminished or limited, but any such
limitations must be "traced up to the consent of the nation itself They can flow

96. See Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave: The War on Terrorism and the Alien Tort Statute, 19
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 105 (2005).
97. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
98. See, e.g., Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 723 (D. Md. 2010) (citing such
legal opinions to support the proposition that "[t]reaties, conventions, and declarations from around
the world further support the global consensus that torture is a violation of the law of nations and is
never permitted, even in wartime."), rev'd, AI-Quraishi v. L-3 Services, Inc., 657 F.3d 201 (4th Cir.
2011) (reversing the district court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss on collateral order
review grounds), rev'd, Al Shimari v. CACI Intem., Inc., 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(ruling that the court did not have jurisdiction over defendants' interlocutory appeals).
99. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, IIU.S. 116, 136 (1812).
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from no other legitimate source." 100 Within a country's territorial jurisdiction, a
nation's sovereignty is "exclusive and absolute." 0 1 Any limitation on a nation's
sovereignty, such as that arising from international law, can only arise with the
consent of the sovereign. 102
To be sure, this definition of sovereignty may not always have prevailed,
even among the nation-states themselves.103 As Stephen Krasner has pointed
out, nations have long been willing to discard certain elements of sovereignty
when it suited their purposes. 104 But, as Marshall's statement in the Schooner
Exchange case suggests, absolute state sovereignty was widely accepted as a
description of the world's political organization in the aftermath of the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648.
While many scholars argue that this version of absolute state sovereignty is
eroding, this claim is overstated. Global governance may be more dream than
certainty. Westphalian sovereignty may be merely a shibboleth for neoisolationists, rather than a value worth protecting. As we readily admit, the
institutions of global governance are only now emerging from their infancy.
Some, such as the U.N. Security Council and the ICJ, have existed since the
adoption of the U.N. Charter, but have sought to expand their reach only in the
last few decades. Proposals for others, such as the World Trade Organization,
took a half-century. 105 A few, such as the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, have reoriented their missions and become more interventionist in
the domestic affairs of nations. 10 6
We do not deny that new species of international cooperation have
emerged. New multilateral agreements regulate the internal as well as external
conduct of nation-states. But what makes the current round of treaties different
is their marriage of sweeping, universal rules with independent institutions of
enforcement. The latest version of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
for example, not only requires national treatment for foreign imports; it also
creates a rulemaking body (the World Trade Organization) to develop
amendments to the treaty, and a court system (the Dispute Settlement
Understanding) to resolve trade disputes. 107 The Rome Statute not only outlaws
war crimes and crimes against humanity; it also creates a prosecutor's office to

100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id.

103.

STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
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107. See Posner& Yoo, supra note 37, at 44-51.
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investigate and prosecute crimes, and a court system to try the defendants.to 8
The Law of the Sea Convention both sets out rules for the free navigation of the
high seas, and creates an international tribunal for the resolution of disputes.' 0 9
The Chemical Weapons Convention creates a Secretariat that can ban new
chemicals and conduct surprise inspections of domestic production sites.1 10
These new forms of multilateral cooperation challenge U.S. sovereignty by
transferring lawmaking authority from the Constitution's organs of government
to international bodies. International agreements have yet to prompt the United
States to hand over any truly serious government function, such as the setting of
monetary policy. However, future international agreements may. The formal
regulation of chemicals under the Chemical Weapons Convention necessitated
the creation of an international agency that exercises the power to ban all use of
any chemical and to conduct surprise inspections on any chemical site. In our
opinion, a similar 10 might be necessary for the successful regulation of climate
change.1 11 The creation of durable institutions that can enforce international
norms within the American legal system would erode Westphalian sovereignty.
Jeremy Rabkin has forcefully argued that these developments undermine
the capacity of nation-states to pursue their national interest. 112 Global
governance disrupts the relationship between a people and their nation by
transferring the locus of legislative and enforcement authority to Os.1 13
Citizens with divided loyalties might be less likely to defend national
interests.114 Rabkin believes that this will cause a decline in global welfare,
since only nation-states retain the strength to stop aggression by authoritarian
15
regimes or to halt human rights catastrophes.]
If the organs of global governance were all institutions such as the U.N.
Security Council or the ICJ, Rabkin's fears would be dispelled. As a permanent
member of the U.N. Security Council, the United States maintains a veto. The
United States has refused to give ICJ decisions effect in its domestic legal
system,ll 6 and has even taken the position that ICJ judgments can only be
enforced against it by a vote of the U.N. Security Council.1 17 The United States

108. Id. at 67-70.
109. Id. at 70-72.
110. John Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical Weapons
Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 87 (1998).
Itl. Julian Ku & John Yoo, Globalization and Structure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv 431, 434
(2011).
112.

See generally JEREMY RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS (2005).

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 374, 376-77 (1998).
See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 509-10 (2008).
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withdrew from the ICJ's mandatory jurisdiction because of Nicaragua's 1986
suit over the CIA's mining of Managua harbor. 118 More recently, the United
States has refused to comply with the ICJ's decisions ordering review and
reconsideration of death penalty verdicts against foreign nationals. 19
But critics of global governance can point to more than the U.N. Charter,
the WTO, or the Law of the Sea Treaty. They can point to the evolution of the
European Union as the future of global governance. Initially, the Communities
began as a free-trade area, but today the European Union is bound together by a
Commission that regulates the economy, trade, consumer safety, antitrust law,
and environmental activity throughout the Union; a Council that has its own
taxing and spending authority; a Court that exercises judicial review over the
legislation of member states; and a Bank that administers monetary policy
through a common currency. These core institutions of pan-European
governance do not undergo regular elections; the only element of popular
representation lies in the European Parliament, which does not have the
authority to issue Europe-wide directives that override national legislation. The
European Union has given birth to a large bureaucracy that seems so distant
from the usual mechanisms of electorate accountability that one of us has
previously criticized Europe as having a "democracy deficit." 120
Thus, the danger is not just that the ICJ may try to stop an American
execution in the odd case, but that such moves are precursors to a more
comprehensive system of global governance. The European Union does not
create merely a forum for the resolution of disputes between European nations,
as the U.N. Security Council does for the great powers. Rather, the European
Union creates an independent international institution that can directly regulate
private individuals and government agencies. It is not dependent on the nationstates to carry out its will. It has no directly elected legislature or executive
branch (though there is a European Parliament with limited powers) that
exercise the normal powers of a government. It is governed by bureaucrats and
judges created by the E.U. treaties. It is, in Rabkin's words, a "postmodern
construction." 1 2 1 We do not claim that this has happened in the United States.
The Supreme Court has refused to carry out ICJ decisions, though on the other
hand, the North American Free Trade Agreement has moved the United States,
Canada, and Mexico into a tighter economic unit. Our point is that regardless of
the origins of an international organization, it may pose a threat to sovereignty
once its powers allow it to directly regulate private citizens and their conduct
without the mediation of a national government.
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New forms of international cooperation clearly follow the European model
as they seek to regulate areas such as pollution, arms control, and trade in
services. Just as the European nations sought to create supranational forms of
governance that would sublimate the nationalist impulses that led to two
destructive world wars, the new forms of global governance seek to submerge
national interests. A treaty on the prohibition of land mines, for example, does
not create a forum for nations to reach accommodation on the use of certain
weapons. Rather, it is an effort primarily driven by NGOs and nations that
already do not use land mines and do not conduct significant military operations
abroad. 122

The International Criminal Court represents the Europeanization of
international law and politics. The ICC does not serve as a forum to arbitrate
disputes between nations. It has its own prosecutors who may bring cases
against the officials of sovereign states before an independent court, which has
the power to sentence and imprison the guilty.1 23 Nations that ratified and have
domestically implemented the Treaty of Rome have an obligation to hand over
individuals wanted by the ICC, but otherwise the Court does not depend on
nations to carry out its decisions. It is true that the Rome Statute allows member
states to investigate their own citizens first before the ICC can intervene. 124 But
this principle of complernentarity grants the ICC the ability to decide whether a
member state has been unwilling to investigate in good faith-and thus gives the
IO the ultimate say on a prosecution.
This fundamental change in the nature of international institutions did not
evolve naturally, but had been propelled along by expansive academic theories.
Leading international legal scholars, such as Abram and Antonia Chayes,
celebrate the arrival of the "new sovereignty." 1 25 The international order is
governed, not by autonomous nation-states that control all affairs within their
borders, but by a "tightly woven fabric of international agreements,
organizations, and institutions that shape their relations with one another and
penetrate deeply into their internal economics and politics." 1 26 Chayes and
Chayes argue that if sovereignty refers to a nation's ability to govern activity
within its borders, then it must move upward to international organizations,

122. Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines: The Role of Nongovernmental Organizationsand the Idea of an InternationalCivil Society, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 91
(2000).
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because globalization means that no individual state can fully control the people
and activity on their territory.1 27
One way that the "new sovereignty" operates, according to Anne-Marie
Slaughter, is through transnational networks of government officials. 128 Finance
ministers meet through organizations like the G-8 and the G-20 to coordinate
solutions to international debt crises. Officials of the United States, Canada, and
Mexico meet through NAFTA bodies to create a transnational environmental
enforcement network. Judges on some national courts increasingly, Slaughter
argues, cite precedents from other countries and international tribunals, stitching
together, in countries that respect international law, something like a
transnational body of law in discrete areas. 129 These networks share
information, build trust between nations, and spread best practices, the
combination of which allows them to harmonize and enforce a common set of
policies and laws. According to Slaughter, transnational networks will
eventually "disaggregate sovereignty" because individual agencies will exercise
authority in a nation as part of an international network, rather than as part of a
nation-state's government. 130
In this vision, international institutions and international law reverse the
traditional understanding of sovereignty. Sovereignty originally meant that a
nation-state was free from any other form of governance in its control of activity
within its borders. 131 A nation-state would not be subject to the political claims
of a supranational entity, such as the Holy Roman Empire, or a higher authority,
such as the Catholic Church. Whether it chose to cooperate with other nations
was a matter of its own consent, usually expressed through the form of treaties
and long customary practice. 132 According to the theories promulgated by
academics and advocates, however, sovereignty is defined not by independence,
but by a state's ability to fulfill international obligations. 133
B. PopularSovereignty
Broad trends in economic integration and shared global governance are
eroding Westphalian sovereignty in powerful ways. But a decline in
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Westphalian sovereignty does not prevent nation-states from maintaining other
forms of sovereignty, or that nation-states will necessarily wither away.
We believe that the American concept of popular sovereignty can help sort
out these dilemmas. By "popular sovereignty," we refer to the prevailing theory
of sovereignty expressed in the U.S. Constitution. Under this framework, the
ultimate sovereign power in the United States is not in the nation's government,
but in its people.
This idea was at the ideological heart of the American Revolution.
Rejecting the concept that sovereignty was vested in the Crown or in the
government, some revolutionaries believed that governments "deriv[ed] their
just Powers from the Consent of the Governed," and that when a government
abused these powers, "it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to
institute new Government." 1 34 Although the true sovereign, according to the
political theory of the day, had to possess unlimited, indivisible, and final
authority, the American people believed that they could delegate narrower
power to the government.
Government officials, however, were not sovereign themselves, but agents
of the people.
As James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 46, "[t]he federal and state
governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted
with different powers, and designated for different purposes."1 35 Madison
reminded critics of the proposed Constitution "that the ultimate authority,
wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone."l 36 The
government can exercise only the power that the people have delegated to it.
Any law that conflicts with the written Constitution is illegal, because it goes
beyond the delegation of power from the people to the government.
To be sure, the Supreme Court has not always accepted the exclusivity of
popular sovereignty. In Curtiss-Wright v. United States, the Court suggested that
the U.S. government might possess powers, at least with respect to foreign
relations, which arise out of America's status as a nation. 137 Curtiss-Wright can
be understood as an expression of Westphalian sovereignty, but it remains
unclear whether it accurately describes the transfer of authority from the people
to the government through the Constitution. This aspect of Curtiss-Wright has
not been developed by subsequent decisions, and scholars have long criticized
Curtiss-Wright for its extra-constitutional search for sovereignty. 138
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Focusing on popular sovereignty rather than Westphalian sovereignty has a
number of consequences. First, analysis of popular sovereignty can draw on
U.S. domestic precedent and experience in allocating constitutional powers
within the U.S. domestic system. This form of analysis can aid in understanding
America's relationships with foreign and international institutions.
Second, popular sovereignty can provide a more flexible baseline for
maintaining national sovereignty. Because of the absolutist claims of
Westphalian sovereignty, almost any incursion or limitation on nation-states is a
diminution. By contrast, popular sovereignty assumes that sovereign powers can
be shared, divided, and limited without giving up on the entire system. In other
words, popular sovereignty can coexist with elements of global governance in
ways that Westphalian sovereignty cannot.
Popular sovereignty is both more and less restrictive than Westphalian
sovereignty. If global capital markets restrict America's ability to maintain the
value of the dollar, her Westphalian sovereignty has been infringed-a nation's
absolute and exclusive power to manage activities within its territory has been
restricted. But such a restriction would not create problems for popular
sovereignty, because it does not undermine the Constitution's allocation of
powers or its guarantees of individual rights. Indeed, popular sovereignty
already assumes that the U.S. government operates under substantial and
fundamental constraints within its territory. The difference is that the United
States cannot fully control external constraints on its sovereignty generated by
the international capital markets, but it can restrict legal limits on its sovereignty
by IOs and multilateral treaties by withholding its consent to international
regimes. On the other hand, if the U.S. government were barred by international
agreement or international law from controlling the value of its currency, the
allocation of governmental powers set forth by the Constitution could potentially
be undermined.
CONCLUSION

Globalization is a sprawling concept with a wide range of definitions. We
have focused on globalization's acceleration of the movement of goods and
services, people, capital, and information in ways that hamper a state's ability to
regulate all activity on its territory-the central definition of national
sovereignty. Conduct that crosses state borders gives rise to demands for
international cooperation. We argue, however, that efforts to solve
globalization's effects by turning automatically to international organizations
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and law that take precedence over national sovereignty are premature and
inconsistent with the continuing power and relevance of nation-states.
Rather than reject international law, or conjure forth the demise of the
nation-state, we propose a middle way. Popular sovereignty establishes the
Constitution as the authoritative mechanism for the generation and enforcement
of national law within the United States. The Constitution's structural
provisions, such as the separation of powers and federalism, set the stage for
making international law and institutions compatible with American democratic
government, and thereby allow the United States to benefit from the gains of
international cooperation.

